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Abstract
An influential suggestion about the relationship between Bayesianism
and Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) holds that IBE functions as
a heuristic to approximate Bayesian reasoning. While this view promises
to unify Bayesianism and IBE in a very attractive manner, important
elements of the view have not yet been spelled out in detail. I present
and argue for a heuristic conception of IBE on which IBE serves primar-
ily to locate the most probable available explanatory hypothesis to serve
as a working hypothesis in an agent’s further investigations. Along the
way, I criticize what I consider to be an overly ambitious conception of
the heuristic role of IBE, according to which IBE serves as a guide to
absolute probability values. My own conception, by contrast, requires
only that IBE can function as a guide to the comparative probability
values of available hypotheses. This is shown to be a much more real-
istic role for IBE given the nature and limitations of the explanatory
considerations with which IBE operates.
1 Introduction
Much of the recent literature on Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) con-
cerns how, if at all, IBE fits into a Bayesian approach to non-deductive rea-
soning. Van Fraassen (1989) famously argued that IBE is incompatible with
Bayesianism since IBE would, according to van Fraassen, require agents to
assign higher probabilities to more explanatory hypotheses than the Bayesian
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rule of conditionalization dictates. However, few philosophers have been con-
vinced that van Fraassen’s suggestion is the most plausible way of finding a
place for IBE in the Bayesian framework (Kvanvig, 1994; Harman, 1997; Dou-
ven, 1999). In addition, van Fraassen’s conclusion leaves Bayesians in the
arguably awkward position of having to deny that explanatory considerations
play any substantive role in non-deductive reasoning. While van Fraassen
seems to endorse this conclusion, most other philosophers will find it unpalat-
able given the frequent appeal to explanatory considerations in both scientific
and everyday reasoning.
Those who do think, contra van Fraassen, that IBE is compatible with
Bayesianism have advocated at least three different approaches to fitting IBE
into the Bayesian framework. Some have argued that IBE and Bayesianism
are different ways of describing what is essentially the same form of reasoning
(Niiniluoto, 1999; Henderson, 2014). Others have argued that explanatory
considerations help to determine the objectively correct prior probabilities
from which Bayesian agents ought to reason (Weisberg, 2009; Huemer, 2009).
Finally, the third and arguably most influential approach has focused on the
idea that IBE might serve as a heuristic to approximate correct Bayesian
reasoning. On this approach, IBE complements Bayesianism by providing a
rule of inference that is appropriate for non-ideal agents and yet enables these
agents to approximate the probabilities that Bayesian reasoning would have
them assign to hypotheses (Okasha, 2000; McGrew, 2003; Lipton, 2004).
The aim of this paper is to explore the limits of this heuristic approach to
IBE and argue for a particular heuristic conception of IBE that respects these
limits. More precisely, I present and argue for a heuristic conception of IBE on
which IBE serves primarily to locate the most probable available explanatory
hypothesis to serve as a working hypothesis in an agent’s further investigations.
Along the way, I criticize what I consider to be an overly ambitious conception
of the heuristic role of IBE, according to which IBE serves as a guide to absolute
probability values. My own conception, by contrast, requires only that IBE
can function as a guide to the comparative probability values of available
hypotheses. This is shown to be a much more realistic role for IBE given
the nature and limitations of the explanatory considerations with which IBE
operates. While this by no means provides a full account of the relationship
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between IBE and Bayesianism, I hope to show that it points in the direction
of a more promising heuristic conception of IBE.
I will proceed as follows. In section 2, I start by clarifying what exactly a
heuristic conception of IBE would be, and what kind of Bayesian probabilities
it is plausibly seen as providing a heuristic for. In section 3, I go on to argue
that since IBE involves comparisons between available explanatory hypotheses,
explanatory considerations cannot generally function as a reliable heuristic for
approximating absolute Bayesian probabilities. In light of this difficulty, I
suggest in section 4 that IBE is plausibly construed as a heuristic primarily
for comparative probabilities, and argue that this still leaves IBE with an
important role to play in a broadly-speaking Bayesian framework, viz. as
the basis for choices about which hypotheses to adopt as working hypotheses.
Section 5 is the conclusion.
2 IBE as a Bayesian Heuristic
As it is standardly conceived, Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) is a
rule of inference in which one infers a hypothesis on the grounds that it would,
if true, provide a better explanation of one’s evidence than any other available
alternative hypothesis (Harman, 1965; Thagard, 1978; Lycan, 1988; Lipton,
2004). What makes one explanation better than another is seldom spelled
out in detail, but is generally taken to depend on various factors known as
explanatory considerations. These include:
Explanatory power : Other things being equal, H1 should be preferred to
H2 if H1 explains more facts (or more kind of facts) than H2.
Antecedent plausibility : Other things being equal, H1 should be preferred
to H2 if H1 fits better than H2 with what one already has reason to
believe.
Numerous other putative explanatory considerations have been proposed – e.g.
simplicity, fecundity, testability, avoidance of ad hoc elements, and explanatory
depth – but it’s a highly contested issue which (if any) of these other factors
IBE should operate with. For example, while simplicity is often referred to as
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an explanatory virtue, many philosophers of science are quite skeptical of its
epistemic force (e.g. Sober, 1990; Dupre, 2002). Since this issue is orthogonal
to my concern in this paper, I will seek to avoid any such contested putative
explanatory considerations by operating only with the two considerations listed
above.
The most detailed and widely discussed account of IBE is Peter Lipton’s
(2004). On Lipton’s view, explanatory considerations are both used to choose
between available hypotheses, and to generate the hypotheses that one chooses
between in an IBE. So, on Lipton’s view, IBE is really a two-step process, where
one first generates a limited set of competing explanatory hypotheses and then
infers the best of those that have been generated in this way. Lipton qualifies
this by saying that in IBE the inferred hypothesis must not only provide the
best explanation; this explanation must also be “good enough”. Finally, Lipton
distinguishes between likely and lovely explanations, arguing that IBE should
be construed as inferring the loveliest explanation, where loveliness is deter-
mined by explanatory considerations such as those mentioned above. However,
Lipton also claims that loveliness tracks “likeliness”, i.e. that lovelier explana-
tions are generally more likely to be true. Since Bayesian reasoning concerns
the probability of hypotheses, Lipton’s contention that loveliness tracks like-
liness underwrites the idea that IBE may provide a heuristic for Bayesian
reasoning.
As Lipton (2004, 107) himself recognizes, the philosophical project of ar-
ticulating how IBE would provide such a heuristic for Bayesian reasoning is
still in its infancy. One question – examined below – is what kind of Bayesian
reasoning IBE should be seen as providing a heuristic for. Before we delve into
that issue, however, we must say something about what it would be for IBE
to be a heuristic to Bayesian reasoning instead of the fundamental and free-
standing inference rule that it is perceived to be by many other authors (see,
e.g., Harman, 1965; Foster, 1982; Lycan, 1988, 2012; Psillos, 2007; Weintraub,
2013). The idea, in short, is that IBE provides a procedure that is both usable
by ordinary epistemic agents and yet approximates Bayesian reasoning. IBE
would thus provide a kind of guideline or recipe that the agent may follow in
her doxastic deliberation – whereas Bayesianism provides the ultimate stan-
dard of evaluation of such doxastic attitudes. Of course, IBE can only serve as
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a heuristic in this way if reasoning in accordance with IBE is something that
does in fact approximate Bayesian reasoning (an issue to which we will return
below). That said, IBE need not accord with Bayesian reasoning exactly and
in every case in order to serve as a heuristic in this sense, since – just as with
any other heuristic – it may fail in extraordinary cases and provide only a
rough guide in the cases in which it does not fail.1
This heuristic conception of IBE assumes that the kind of explanatory rea-
soning involved in IBE is more accessible to ordinary human agents than the
kind of probabilistic reasoning required by Bayesianism. There is consider-
able empirical evidence for this assumption. Well-known results from Tversky
and Kahneman (1984) have inspired extensive research into the various ways
in which ordinary people are quite poor at probabilistic reasoning. From a
Bayesian point of view, there is thus a clear advantage to having accessible
heuristics to approximate Bayesian reasoning, which is what IBE promises to
deliver on the heuristic conception. Of course, if IBE is to play this role, ordi-
nary agents must at least be able to, and preferably be disposed to, actually
reason in accordance with the recommendations of IBE. Happily, recent empir-
ical research into the role of explanation in reasoning suggests that agents do
indeed prefer theories that are more explanatorily powerful (Read and Marcus-
Newhall, 1993; Preston and Epley, 2005), fit better with what one already be-
lieves (Pennington and Hastie, 1992; Sloman, 1994), and that exhibit a kind of
simplicity (Read and Marcus-Newhall, 1993; Lombrozo, 2007). Summarizing
this body of work, Lombrozo (2016b, 749) says that “when children and adults
generate and evaluate explanations, they recruit explanatory virtues, such as
simplicity and breadth, as evaluative constraints on reasoning.”2
The other main issue for a heuristic conception of IBE concerns what sort
of Bayesian reasoning IBE is meant to provide a heuristic for. In general,
1I take this characterization of what it would be for IBE to serve as a heuristic for
Bayesian reasoning to be in harmony with Chow’s (2015) recent in-depth study of the
concept of a “heuristic” as used in cognitive science. Chow characterizes inferential cognitive
heuristics as “satisficing cognitive procedures that can be expressed as rules one reasons in
accordance with; they require little cognitive resources for their recruitment and execution;
they operate by exploiting concepts” (Chow, 2015, 45).
2For other summaries and interpretations of this research, see Keil (2006) and Lombrozo
(2006, 2010, 2011, 2016a). Much of this empirical work is inspired by Thagard (1989).
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Bayesians hold that the credences of rational agents should satisfy the Kol-
mogorov axioms of probability, and can therefore be represented as probabili-
ties. However, there are many distinct ways to be a Bayesian in this sense, and
some Bayesian views may be more plausibly coupled with IBE than others.3
For our purposes, Subjective Bayesianism will be taken to be the view that
the only other constraint on the credences of rational agents is the diachronic
requirement of Bayesian Conditionalization. Of course, Subjective Bayesian-
ism (thus construed) is an extremely permissive view of epistemic rationality,
with very minimal constraints requiring only a kind of formal synchronic and
diachronic coherence in a rational agent’s credences. Accordingly, most epis-
temologists (including many Bayesians) hold that there are some additional
constraints on rational credences, although there is disagreement on what they
are and how they should be characterized. These additional constraints might
be principles connecting credences to physical chances such as the Principal
Principle (Lewis, 1980), principles connecting credences to symmetry consid-
erations such as the Principle of Indifference (Laplace, 1951; Keynes, 1921)
and the Maximum Entropy Principle (Jaynes, 2003; Rosenkrantz, 1977), or
even principles that constrain rational credences based on explanatory con-
siderations (Huemer, 2009; Weisberg, 2009). Here I will refer to views that
place some additional constraints of this sort on rational credences as objec-
tive Bayesian views, keeping in mind that this category includes a range of
views that accept different constraints on rational credences.
So which kind of Bayesianism is IBE most plausibly seen as providing a
heuristic for? Jonathan Weisberg (2009) argues that coupling IBE with Sub-
jective Bayesianism would “rob IBE of some of its most interesting applications
[and] much of its intuitive appeal” (Weisberg, 2009, 135-136). On Weisberg’s
view, the basic problem with construing IBE as a heuristic for Subjective
Bayesianism is that the two modes of inference track fundamentally different
things: IBE tracks explanatory loveliness, while Subjective Bayesianism tracks
diachronic consistency with an agent’s prior credences. Since an agent’s prior
credences need not exhibit a preference for more explanatory hypotheses ac-
cording to Subjective Bayesianism, IBE and Subjective Bayesianism deliver
3See e.g. Good’s (1971) well-known estimation that there are at least 46656 distinct
Bayesian views.
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conflicting verdicts in many cases. In my view, Weisberg’s criticism is com-
pelling, and so I think he is correct to dismiss a conception of IBE on which
IBE serves as a heuristic for Subjective Bayesianism. However, it’s important
to note that it does not follow from Weisberg’s criticism that IBE could not
function as a heuristic for any Bayesian reasoning. Specifically, Weisberg’s
criticism leaves open that IBE may serve as a heuristic to objective Bayesian
views, which posit constraints upon rational credences that go beyond those of
synchronic and diachronic probabilistic consistency. Indeed, Weisberg himself
suggests that IBE should be seen as providing objectivist constraints on ratio-
nal probability assignments. A similar suggestion is made by Leah Henderson
(2014), who argues that the preference for explanatory hypotheses follows from
standard objectivist constraints such as the Maximum Entropy Principle. Ei-
ther way, the preference for explanatory theories recommended by IBE would
also appear in the probability distributions licensed by these objectivist con-
straints.
There are certainly important remaining questions about how the prefer-
ence for explanatory theories would either grow out or, or be posited into,
objective Bayesian views in this way.4 I will not be focusing on these issues
here, since my concern is with the extent to which IBE could serve as a heuris-
tic for objective Bayesian reasoning, i.e. with whether the former may be a
doxastic decision procedure that is appropriate for realizing the latter in ordi-
nary agents. Weisberg and Henderson do not address this issue since they are
not concerned with arguing that IBE may work as a heuristic in this way. In
order for IBE to serve a heuristic role of this kind, it is not enough that IBE
and objective Bayesian constraints substantially agree on how an agent ought
to go about her non-deductive reasoning; IBE must also provide a relatively
accessible way for ordinary agents to make doxastic decisions in light of the
available evidence. On the face of it, IBE does seem well-suited for playing this
role, since the explanatory considerations to which it appeals certainly appear
more accessible than the often elusive probability constraints and calculations
4I am myself most sympathetic to a Henderson-style view on which preferences for more
explanatory theories grow out of independently-motivated objectivist constraints on proba-
bilities. Henderson refers to this view of the relationship between IBE and Bayesianism as
emergent compatibilism, since it means that “IBE would ‘emerge’ without the Bayesian do-
ing anything differently from what she would anyway” (Henderson, 2014, 699).
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that are the basis of objective Bayesian reasoning.5 However, as we shall now
see, this idea is not as straightforward as one might have thought.
3 The Limits of Explanatory Heuristics
So far I have suggested that the most plausible version of the heuristic concep-
tion of IBE is one on which IBE functions as a procedure for approximating
objective Bayesian reasoning. In this section, I consider a problem for this
heuristic conception of IBE, which I will argue should lead us to settle for a
more moderate heuristic conception of IBE. The problem, in short, is that IBE
involves an essentially comparative evaluation of available hypotheses, while
Bayesian reasoning involves an non-comparative or absolute evaluation of such
hypotheses. To draw out the problem, I will first consider what I take to be
a relatively unproblematic way in which IBE could serve its heuristic role,
viz. as a guide to comparative probabilities, and then illustrate the difficulties
involved in having IBE play the more ambitious role of providing a guide to
absolute probabilities.
3.1 IBE and Comparative Probabilistic Evaluations
Suppose we have some evidence E, background knowledge B, and a set HA =
{H1, ..., Hn} of available hypotheses that provide competing potential expla-
nations of E (perhaps in conjunction with auxiliary assumptions from B).
On an objectivist heuristic conception, IBE provides a heuristic guide to the
objectively correct probabilities that should be assigned to these hypotheses
in light of E and B. The objectivist Bayesian accepts a version of Bayesian
Conditionalization according to which the credence you should assign to a
hypothesis Hi ∈ HA, having obtained evidence E, should equal the credence
that you should have assigned, before obtaining E, to Hi conditional on E.
So, according to objectivist Bayesian views, one’s credence in Hi given E and
background knowledge B should be P (Hi|E ∧B), where P (·) is a probability
function sanctioned by the objectivist principles or constraints in question.
5From now one, I will use “Bayesian” as short for “objective Bayesian” unless otherwise
indicated.
8
On the heuristic conception we are currently considering, IBE functions as a
guide to assigning probabilities of this sort.
Note that by Bayes’s Theorem, the comparative posterior probabilities of
two hypotheses are determined by their comparative priors and likelihoods.
That is, an inequality such as
P (Hi|E ∧B) > P (Hj|E ∧B) (1)
is, by Bayes’s Theorem, equivalent to:
P (Hi|B) P (E|Hi ∧B) > P (Hj|B) P (E|Hj ∧B) (2)
Now, several authors have argued that explanatory considerations track priors
and likelihoods. In particular, it has been argued that, all other things being
equal, P (E|Hi∧B) > P (E|Hj∧B) wheneverHi has greater explanatory power
than Hj vis-à-vis E (McGrew, 2003; Henderson, 2014). Similarly, it seems
plausible that, all other things being equal, a hypothesis that fits better with
what one already has reasons to believe is more probable irrespective of the new
evidence E, and thus that P (Hi|B) > P (Hj|B) whenever Hi is antecedently
more plausible than Hj in the relevant sense (Okasha, 2000; Lipton, 2004).
As noted above, I won’t be assessing these claims here, since my concern is
not with the claim that explanatory considerations track objective Bayesian
probabilities per se, but with the idea that the explanatory considerations may
function as a heuristic for objective Bayesian reasoning.
Assuming that there is, at least ceteris paribus, such a robust connection
between the relevant set of explanatory considerations on the one hand and pri-
ors and likelihoods on the other hand, it does appear quite plausible that IBE
may serve its heuristic function when it comes to comparing the probabilities
of two or more competing explanatory hypotheses. This is best illustrated by
an example: Suppose a detective arrives at a crime scene, where a woman lies
dead from a shot wound. Her brother called in to report the crime, claiming
that he had found his sister in this state when he arrived at her home. How-
ever, searching the apartment, no suicide note was found. Let these pieces of
information be the relevant evidence E in this case. Having considered this
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evidence for just a moment, our detective forms three hypotheses concerning
the victim’s cause of death:
Hb: The victim’s brother shot her.
Hs: The victim shot herself.
Ha: The victim’s brother hired an assassin to shoot her.
For the detective, these are the available competing explanatory hypotheses
vis-à-vis the detective’s evidence E. Note that this set of available hypotheses
is not exhaustive: the actual cause of death might be something else entirely.6
Now let’s suppose that the detective reasons as follows. Comparing Hb and
Hs, the detective notes that Hb, in contrast to Hs, provides an explanation
for the fact that there was no suicide note; and since Hb and Hs are at least
roughly equal with regard to other explanatory considerations, she concludes
that explanatory considerations favor Hb over Hs. This reasoning tracks what
may plausibly be taken as the comparative objective probabilities of Hb and
Hs, since the fact that Hb explains more of the evidence E than Hs may be
taken to indicate that P (E|Hb ∧ B)  P (E|Hs ∧ B), while the fact that Hs
and Hb are roughly equal in other explanatory considerations indicates that
P (Hb|B) ≈ P (Hs|B). It then follows, from the equivalence of (1) and (2),
that P (Hb|E ∧B) > p(Hs|E ∧B).
A similar point applies to a comparison of Hb and Ha. Any detective
will know beforehand (i.e. irrespective of E) that hired assassinations are
extremely rare; indeed, they will know that murders are almost always com-
mitted by the victims’ family members or acquaintances. The detective would
thus conclude that Hb is antecedently more plausible than Ha, and since Hb
and Ha are at least roughly equal with regard to other explanatory consid-
erations (such as explanatory power), she concludes that explanatory con-
siderations favor Hb over Ha. Again, this reasoning plausibly tracks com-
parative objective probabilities, since the fact that Hb is antecedently more
plausible than Ha indicates that P (Hb|B)  P (Ha|B), and the fact that
Hb and Ha are roughly equal with regards to other explanatory considera-
6Indeed, available hypotheses almost never are exhaustive. This is an important point
to which will return below.
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tions indicates that P (E|Hb ∧ B) ≈ P (E|Ha ∧ B), from which it follows that
P (Hb|E ∧B) > P (Ha|E ∧B) by the same token as before.
The important point here is that the detective’s reasoning in terms of ex-
planatory considerations plausibly delivers the same preference for Hb over Hs
and Ha as does a comparison of objective Bayesian probabilities, and yet rea-
soning in terms of explanatory considerations is considerably more tractable
for ordinary agents such as the detective. Plausibly, the detective can tell
almost immediately that Hb is preferable to Hs in light of its greater explana-
tory power, while she may not be able to reason probabilistically to the same
conclusion nearly as quickly – or even at all. Similarly, the detective can tell
immediately that Hb is preferable to Hs in light of its being antecedently more
plausible, while she cannot immediately determine the relative probabilities
as quickly – or even at all – by calculating the priors and likelihoods of these
hypotheses. In sum, then, IBE does appear to be able to serve a heuristic
role for objective Bayesian reasoning in that it provides an accessible way of
estimating comparative probabilities of explanatory hypotheses relative to a
given set of evidence.
So far I have focused on cases in which some explanatory considerations
favor one hypothesis over another while other explanatory considerations re-
main roughly neutral on the two hypotheses. Of course, there will also be cases
in which explanatory considerations pull in opposite directions. As a case in
point, consider a comparison between Hs and Ha. Hs is antecedently more
plausible than Ha relative to B, but Ha explains more of E since it explains the
fact that the victim did not leave a suicide note. In this particular comparison,
we may well want to say that the comparison in explanatory power is so decisive
as to clearly outweigh the fact that antecedent plausibility favors Hs over Ha.
On the probabilistic side, this would mean that P (E|Hs ∧B) P (E|Ha ∧B)
while P (Hs|B) 6 P (Ha|B), so that P (Hs|E ∧ B) < P (Ha|E ∧ B). However,
in other cases, the comparisons might be closer, with IBE offering no clear ver-
dict on which hypothesis should be preferred. In such cases the probabilities of
the two hypotheses are simply too close for IBE to make a decisive call. This
is what we should expect from a heuristic form of reasoning, since heuristics
are designed only to give approximate judgments and may be of limited use
when greater precision is called for.
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At any rate, it’s worth highlighting that if and in so far as IBE provides
a heuristic to compare the probabilities of two hypotheses in this way, it also
provides a heuristic for ranking a set of three or more hypotheses from most
to least probable, allowing for ties and comparisons that are too close to call.
Notice that this ranking is obtained by comparative probabilities only – no
absolute probabilities need to be assigned in order to obtain the ranking. For
example, in order to rank Hb as most probable among Hb, Hs and Ha, we did
not need to estimate the absolute (i.e. non-comparative) values for their priors
P (Hb|B), P (Hs|B) and P (Ha|B). Thus, in so far as IBE can provide a reliable
heuristic guide to comparative probabilities, it can also provide such a guide
for probability rankings.7 In particular, then, IBE could serve as a heuristic
for identifying the hypotheses with the highest probabilities in a given set of
available explanatory hypotheses. (This point will be important below.)
3.2 IBE and Absolute Probabilistic Evaluations
So far we have examined how IBE may provide a heuristic for making compar-
ative judgments about the objective Bayesian probabilities of two or more ex-
planatory hypotheses. However, any standard version of Bayesianism operates
with more than comparisons between probabilities of two or more hypotheses.
Bayesians are interested not only in whether Hi is more probable than Hj, but
also how probable each of Hi and Hj are in light of the evidence E at a given
time. In principle, these absolute probabilities can of course be calculated in
the usual way by appealing to a standard version of Bayes’s Theorem:
P (Hi|E ∧B) = P (Hi|B) P (E|Hi ∧B)
P (E|B) (3)
The question, however, is whether IBE helps ordinary agents do this with
any reliability, such that we can say that IBE provides an accessible heuristic
7If this seems puzzling, consider an analogy: Suppose you needed to find the tallest
person in a room without measuring anyone’s height. One way to do this is to ask everyone
to line up according to the following rule: Make sure the person on your left is at least as
short as you are and that the person on your right is at least as tall as you are. Assuming
everyone follows the rule, the people in the room will now be ordered from smallest to tallest
without determining anyone’s absolute height.
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for objective Bayesian reasoning with absolute probability values. I will now
argue that IBE does not provide us with a heuristic for this purpose in typical
cases, since the explanatory considerations appealed to in IBE are generally
not suitable for indicating absolute probability values.
The problem that I will be focusing on can be brought out by noticing a
crucial difference between absolute and comparative probabilistic evaluations.
By (3), the value of P (Hi|E ∧B) depends crucially on the marginal likelihood
P (E|B) – a term that drops out when the probability of two hypotheses are
being compared (as in (1) and (2)). Unlike the prior P (Hi|B) and likelihood
P (E|Hi ∧ B), the marginal likelihood P (E|B) does not map neatly onto any
explanatory considerations possessed by Hi vis-à-vis E, since these are all ei-
ther features of the Hi’s relationship with the background knowledge B (e.g.
antecedent plausibility) or Hi’s relationship with the evidence E (e.g. explana-
tory power). Indeed, since Hi does not even occur in P (E|B), it seems clear
that the value of this probability is not tracked by any explanatory considera-
tion of Hi in any straightforward way (whether this probability is tracked by
explanatory considerations in some indirect way will be discussed below). Per-
haps for this reason, those who argue that IBE can be located in the Bayesian
framework tend to focus on priors and likelihoods, and leave out discussions of
how explanatory considerations would track the marginal likelihood P (E|B)
(see, e.g., Okasha, 2000; Weisberg, 2009; Henderson, 2014).
To my knowledge, Lipton (2004, 115-116) is the only proponent of the
heuristic conception of IBE who makes any suggestion for how IBE might
track the marginal likelihood. Echoing a common Bayesian sentiment, Lipton
refers to P (E|B) as “tantamount to how surprising it would be to observe E”
(Lipton, 2004, 116).8 If P (E|B) is to be an constrained in line with objective
Bayesian views (see §2.2), this must be taken to refer to how surprising it
should be to observe E, as opposed to how surprised an agent would in fact
be if she were to observe E. Indeed, Lipton immediately goes on to say that
IBE helps us track E’s surprisingness because it “will be determined in part
8This is slightly misleading since it may seem to suggest that surprising evidence has a
high marginal likelihood. Presumably, the quantity Lipton meant to be describing is not the
marginal likelihood P (E|B) but its reciprocal 1P (E|B) (which is what gets multiplied with
the prior and likelihood in Bayes’s Theorem).
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by how good an explanation of E my current beliefs would supply.” (Lipton,
2004, 116)
Let’s try to unpack Lipton’s idea here. In a Bayesian framework, an agent’s
“current beliefs” are her credences prior to conditionalization; and according to
objective Bayesian views, such credences should equal the objective Bayesian
probabilities conditional on background evidence. Some of these probabilities
will be assigned to hypotheses that would, if true, explain the evidence E –
call these hypotheses H1-Hm. If we assume that H1-Hm are mutually exclusive
and jointly exhaustive,9 we can write P (E|B) as a function of the priors and
likelihoods of H1-Hm thus:
P (E|B) =
m∑
j=1
P (Hj|B) P (E|Hj ∧B) (4)
So if explanatory considerations track the priors and likelihoods of each hy-
pothesis H1-Hm, P (E|B) would indeed be determined by the explanatory
loveliness of H1-Hm vis-à-vis the evidence E, as Lipton’s comment suggests.
Although this idea is quite attractive from a purely formal point of view,
the question that is relevant for our purposes is whether estimating explana-
tory loveliness of each hypothesis H1-Hm is an accessible heuristic for tracking
P (E|B) and thus for indicating the absolute probability of Hi given E. One
obvious problem is that it would require agents using IBE as a heuristic to
have some reliable way of simultaneously estimating the explanatory loveliness
of each and every one of the hypotheses H1-Hm before making an inference
by IBE. In addition, such agents would presumably have to have some way
of aggregating the explanatory loveliness of each hypothesis into an overall
9It might seem unreasonable thatH1-Hm could be jointly exhaustive, since one possibility
that cannot be ruled out a priori (and thus should not be assigned probability 0) is that
there is no explanation for E. However, there are views on which the claim that there is no
explanation for a phenomenon counts as a (degenerate) explanation of that phenomenon.
For example, Lewis (1986) and Skow (2014) both hold that the information that an event
is uncaused or coincidental counts as an explanation of that event. So, for the sake of
Lipton’s argument, I will assume that H1-Hm are indeed exhaustive and thus that they
include a hypotheses on which there is no explanation for E. (See also (Dellsén, 2016a)
for an argument that competing explanatory hypotheses should be mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive in a maximally plausible conception of IBE.)
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estimation of the explanatory loveliness provided by them all. This would be
a daunting task for any ordinary agent, which casts serious doubts on whether
IBE could serve as an accessible heuristic if this were required.10 I want to set
this problem aside, however, since there is an even more serious problem with
this proposal.
The problem, in short, is that IBE operates on a limited number of available
explanatory hypotheses as opposed to a set of jointly exhaustive hypotheses.11
When ordinary agents infer by IBE from some evidence E, they have (at least
normally) considered only a small fraction of all the hypotheses H1-Hm which
provide potential explanations of a given E, so tracking P (E|B) by means of
estimating the explanatory loveliness of all potential explanations of E would
require agents to estimate the explanatory loveliness of hypotheses they have
never even considered. This would clearly make IBE useless as a heuristic.
In our detective case from before, we would have to estimate the explanatory
loveliness not only of Hb, Hs and Ha but also of all the potential explanations
that the detective has not even considered. In that case, the detective could
not employ IBE in the first place – she would be forced to wait until she had
considered all possible explanations of the evidence. If that were required for
IBE to apply, IBE would clearly be useless in this case.
Of course, we could conceive of IBE as selecting the best explanation from a
set of jointly exhaustive hypotheses – thus requiring of IBE-employing agents
that they have already exhausted the logical space of possible explanations of
E. But then IBE would have no hope of providing an accessible heuristic for
ordinary agents in normal situations, since such agents have rarely, if indeed
ever, considered all explanatory hypotheses in logical space. This problem
can be thought of as a dilemma for using explanatory considerations to track
P (E|B): Either the available explanatory hypotheses with which IBE operates
are required to include all possible explanations of the evidence E, or they are
10Of course, it is ultimately an empirical issue whether this is something ordinary agents
are capable of doing. But it would surely be more than a little surprising if ordinary agents
were capable of this extremely sophisticated sort of explanatory reasoning in light of how
poor we are at related cognitive tasks.
11This is acknowledged by all proponents of IBE of which I am aware who comment on
the issue at all, e.g. Lycan (1988, 129) and Lipton (2004, 149).
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not. If they are, then IBE would not be usable by ordinary agents in typical
cases, since the agents have not considered all possible explanations of E in
such cases. If they are not, then the estimations of explanatory loveliness
of available explanatory hypotheses do not (even if correct) track P (E|B) in
typical cases, since they would determine the priors and likelihoods of only
a small fraction of the hypotheses occurring on the right-hand side of (4).
Either way, IBE would not provide an accessible heuristic that tracks P (E|B)
in typical cases.12
Having said this, I wish to acknowledge that there is a class of cases in which
this problem does admit of a qualified solution. Suppose one has good reasons
to believe that all but one explanatory hypothesis Hi for some set of facts,
including those that one has not considered, will provide so poor explanations
for E that their contribution to the value of P (E|B) will be negligible. In that
case, notice that all the terms in the right-hand side of (4) except for those in
which Hi occurs will be close to 0. Thus we have:
P (E|B) ≈ P (Hi|B) P (E|Hi ∧B) (5)
By (3), it then follows that P (Hi|E ∧B) ≈ 1.13 So, in cases in which we have
reason to believe that all other explanations will be so poor as to be negligible,
we have reason to believe that the probability of the explanatory hypothesis
in question will be very high (i.e. close to unity). In this way, we may well be
12The problem that I am discussing here will remind some readers of van Fraassen’s Bad
Lot Objection against IBE. (van Fraassen, 1989, 142-3) This objection holds that IBE cannot
be an inductively strong form of inference since the available explanatory hypotheses from
which one is choosing in an IBE might very well not include a true explanatory hypothesis;
however, if the lot of available explanatory hypothesis does not include a true hypothesis,
then IBE will inevitably lead to one inferring a false hypothesis. Although the problem
with which I am concerned here is superficially similar to the Bad Lot Objection, the two
should not be confused. This is partly because van Fraassen’s Bad Lot Objection is directed
at an entirely different conception of IBE – a non-probabilistic and (by van Fraassen’s own
lights) unsophisticated version of IBE. More importantly, the problem with which I am
concerned is not that the true explanatory hypothesis might not be in the “lot” of available
hypotheses we are considering, but that IBE cannot appeal to the explanatory loveliness of
the hypotheses that are not included in this “lot”. So the problem I am interested in arises
even for “good” lots (i.e. lots that contain a true hypothesis), provided only that these lots
do not exhaust the logical space of possible explanations of the evidence.
13Of course, P (E|B) cannot be higher than the product of P (Hi|B) and P (E|Hi ∧ B).
Nor could P (Hi|E ∧B) be higher than 1.
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able to use explanatory considerations as a kind of heuristic to estimate that
the probability of Hi will be very high.14
While I hesitate to call this an Inference to the Best Explanation,15 this
would certainly be a form of reasoning in which explanatory considerations
provide a heuristic for estimating absolute probabilities of a certain kind. Of
course, it only applies in a circumscribed range of cases, viz. those in which we
have good reason to believe that all alternative explanations are so poor as to
be negligible. On the other hand, this type of reasoning may well provide an
apt description of how scientists arrived at many currently accepted scientific
theories. For example, it seems to me that we have good reason to believe that
every genuine alternative to the atomic theory of matter will be so poor an
explanation of our total set of evidence about the submicroscopic structure of
the world that their contribution to the marginal likelihood will be negligible,
allowing us to conclude that the probability of the atomic theory is close to
unity. This puts me in direct opposition to anti-realists such as Stanford (2006)
who are skeptical of inferences of this kind, but that is a place where I am quite
happy to be.16
So I do not deny that it is possible for explanatory considerations to provide
a rough guide to absolute probabilities in the limiting case where we have good
reason to believe all other explanations are so poor as to have a negligible
effect on the marginal likelihood. However, in typical cases in which IBE is
meant to apply – e.g. in our detective case from before – we cannot make
this assumption. In those cases, the absolute probability of the hypotheses
under consideration will depend crucially on the probability of alternative
explanatory hypotheses, most of which we have not even considered in a typical
IBE. Since IBE predictably does not provide a heuristic for tracking these
probabilities, IBE is unsuitable as a heuristic for estimating the absolute values
of objective Bayesian probabilities. Now, as I have indicated, I still think IBE
14See also (Dellsén, 2017a) for a different way in which we might sometimes be able to
use explanatory considerations to estimate that the probability of a hypothesis is high.
15“Inference to the Only Explanation” may be a more appropriate term for this sort of
inference. For an explanationist account along these lines, see Bird (2005, 2007). See also
Earman (1992) for a Bayesian account of eliminative inferences.
16And a place where we should all be happy to be, as argued in (Dellsén, 2016b).
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has an important heuristic role to play with respect to Bayesian reasoning,
even in typical cases – albeit a different and more modest role than one might
have otherwise thought. Before I get to that, however, let me consider two
possible objections to the argument of this section.
3.3 Objections and Replies
Objection 1 : The first objection is based on a logical maneuver discussed in
a similar context by Lipton (1993, 94-96).17 Above I suggested that com-
parative evaluations between available explanatory hypotheses are relatively
unproblematic for IBE. Now, the idea behind the current objection is to reduce
any absolute evaluation of a hypothesis Hi to a comparative evaluation of Hi
and the corresponding “null hypothesis”, ¬Hi. Notice that P (Hi|E ∧B) > 0.5
just in case P (Hi|E ∧B) > P (¬Hi|E ∧B), which in turn holds if and only if:
P (Hi|B) P (E|Hi ∧B) > P (¬Hi|B) P (E|¬Hi ∧B) (6)
If IBE provides a reliable heuristic for comparative evaluations such as these,
then it would also provide a reliable heuristic for a kind of absolute evalua-
tion.18 In this way, comparative evaluations would at least take us a long way
towards providing estimations of absolute probabilities as well.
Reply : I’m happy to concede that there may be some cases in which the
absolute probabilities may be approximated in this way, viz. when Hi and
¬Hi both provide potential explanations of the evidence at hand.19 Generally,
however, ifHi provides a potential explanation of E, its negation ¬Hi does not.
As a consequence, its explanatory power is trivially nonexistent – or, if you
17Interestingly, a suggestion along these was already discussed and rejected by van
Fraassen (1980, 21-22).
18Indeed, by the same token, P (Hi|E∧B) ≈ 1 just in case P (Hi|E∧B) P (¬Hi|E∧B),
which holds if and only if:
P (Hi|B) P (E|Hi ∧B) P (¬Hi|B) P (E|¬Hi ∧B) (7)
So, if all explanatory considerations strongly favor one hypothesis over another, then we
could perhaps use IBE to estimate that P (Hi|E ∧B) ≈ 1.
19I have not been able to think up any cases of this sort, but I am also not aware of any
reason why such cases would be impossible in principle.
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prefer, undefined. To illustrate, consider Hb from our detective example. Here,
¬Hb is the hypothesis that the victim’s brother did not shoot his sister. While
this hypothesis is certainly intelligible, notice that it provides no explanation
at all of the evidence at hand, since it doesn’t tell you anything about the
victim’s cause of death apart from the negative claim that Hb is false. In so
far as it makes sense to compare the explanatory power of ¬Hb to that of Hb
at all, this consideration would thus trivially favor Hb over ¬Hb in virtue of
¬Hb’s inability to provide any explanation of the victim’s death.
To see why this kind of trivial favoring of a hypothesis over its negation
cannot be correct (at least not in an objective Bayesian framework), consider
again a set of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive explanatory hypotheses
H1-Hm. If comparisons of explanatory power between each of these hypotheses
and their negations are allowed (and supposing that such comparisons make
sense at all), they would trivially favor each explanatory hypothesis Hj over
its null hypothesis ¬Hj (where 1 ≤ j ≤ m). Since explanatory power is meant
to track likelihoods, we would then get:
P (E|Hj ∧B) > P (E|¬Hj ∧B), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m (8)
This amounts to saying that the likelihood ratio (relative to E) is positive for
all these hypotheses H1-Hm, which in turn entails that conditionalizing on E
raises the probability of every single one of these hypotheses:
P (Hj|E ∧B) > P (Hj|B), for 1 ≤ j ≤ m (9)
However, since H1-Hm are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, the prob-
ability axioms dictate that both their prior probabilities, and their posterior
probabilities, must sum to one:
m∑
j=1
P (Hj|B) = 1 (10)
m∑
j=1
P (Hj|E ∧B) = 1 (11)
Hence, contra (9) (and (8)), it is impossible for E to raise the probability of
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all these hypotheses H1-Hm (although it is of course possible for E to raise
the probability of some of them provided that the probability of some of the
other hypotheses is lowered by E). To put the point differently, any agent
who trivially favors any explanatory hypothesis over its negation by always
assigning higher likelihoods to the former than to the latter will end up being
probabilistically incoherent. This clearly would not serve as a reliable guide
to objective Bayesian probabilities (or, indeed, to anything else that satisfies
the probability axioms).
In sum, then, Lipton’s suggestion that that we evaluate the absolute prob-
ability of Hi by comparing its explanatory loveliness with its corresponding
null hypothesis ¬Hi would lead to a trivial favoring of Hi over ¬Hi in terms of
their respective explanatory powers. Given that comparisons in explanatory
power is meant to correspond to comparisons of likelihoods on the current
suggestion, this kind of trivial favoring leads to incoherent probability assign-
ments. To avoid this absurd conclusion, we must reject Lipton’s suggestion
that IBE provides any way of evaluating the explanatory loveliness of a null
hypothesis ¬Hi in relation to E, except possibly in the rare cases in which the
negation of an explanatory hypothesis itself provides a potential explanation
of E (assuming such cases exist at all). Since this is not the case in most –
and certainly not in all – cases in which IBE is meant to apply, the logical
maneuver of obtaining an absolute evaluation of Hi by means of comparing it
with ¬Hi will not work generally.20
Objection 2 : The second objection is “transcendental”. According to this
objection, ordinary agents routinely make estimations of the absolute proba-
bilities of various hypotheses, including hypotheses that are meant to provide
explanations. For example, we say that Darwin’s theory of natural selection is
very likely to be a true, while Lamarck’s theory of acquired characteristics is
likely to be false. These are estimations of absolute probabilities as opposed to
merely comparative estimations. If my arguments are correct, however, IBE
would not provide a reliable heuristic for this purpose, so such estimations
would seem to be systematically unreliable by my lights. While such absolute
probability estimations may sometimes be unreliable, it would be gratuitous
20For further discussion of Lipton’s suggestion, see (Dellsén, 2017b, 33-5).
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to assume that this is systematically so. Thus, concludes the objection, IBE
must be a reliable heuristic for absolute probabilities of explanatory hypothe-
ses, contrary to what I have argued.
Reply : This objection is based on a misunderstanding of the argument of
section 3.2. I did not argue that epistemic agents have no means of estimating
the absolute probabilities of explanatory hypotheses. What I argued is that
IBE cannot generally serve as a heuristic for this purpose, i.e. be an accessible
decision procedure on the basis of which ordinary agents could assign rational
credences to propositions. To say that IBE cannot play this role is not to
say that it’s impossible to reliably estimate absolute probabilities by some
other means, e.g. by using some other heuristic. Indeed, nothing that I
have said rules out that agents could estimate absolute probabilities directly,
i.e. without using any heuristic at all. For example, the reason we think
that Lamarck’s theory is very likely false is hardly because it fails to possess
some explanatory virtues in the appropriate quantity, but because the theory
conflicts with observed evidence in straightforward ways. We don’t need any
explanatory heuristic to tell us that such a theory is very unlikely to be true,
any more than we need an explanatory heuristic to tell us whether it is raining
outside when we look out the window. It is important in this respect to recall
that Bayesianism does not itself provide any heuristic for non-ideal agents to
approximate its model of rational non-deductive reasoning. So my argument in
section 3.2 leaves Bayesianism in no worse shape vis-à-vis reliable estimations
of absolute probabilities than it was before the introduction of the heuristic
conception of IBE.
Besides, as I discussed towards the end of section 3.2, I do think there
are circumstances under which a kind of explanatory heuristic does allow us
to estimate absolute probabilities, viz. when we have good reason to believe
that all alternative explanations are so poor as to have a negligible influence
on the marginal likelihood. Darwin’s theory of natural selection would be
a case in point in my view, since I think we have good reason to believe
that all alternative explanations of biological evolution will provide very poor
explanations of the evidence that has been accumulated over the past one and
a half century. In my view, that is why we are entitled to say that Darwin’s
theory of natural selection is very likely true. So the argument of section 3.2
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is not only compatible with agents making reliable estimations of absolute
probabilities by other means than IBE; it is also compatible with agents using
explanatory considerations in certain favorable circumstances to estimate that
theories are very likely true.
4 Choosing Working Hypotheses by IBE
The previous section argued that using IBE as a heuristic to absolute probabil-
ities is deeply problematic in typical cases since we generally have considered
only a fraction of the explanatory hypotheses that are relevant for estimating
absolute probabilities by IBE. If this is correct, then IBE typically indicates
only how the probability of one available explanatory hypothesis compares
with that of another such hypothesis. However, since Bayesian reasoning (at
least as traditionally conceived) operates with absolute as opposed to merely
comparative probabilities, this might seem to preclude any substantive heuris-
tic role for IBE in a Bayesian framework for non-deductive reasoning. This
section argues that this conclusion would be too hasty: IBE can play an im-
portant heuristic role in Bayesian reasoning even though it is incapable of
providing a guide to absolute probabilities in the traditional way. In short, I
shall argue that through identifying the hypotheses with the highest proba-
bilities in a given set of available hypotheses, IBE indicates which hypotheses
Bayesian inquirers ought to make into the focal points of further testing and
experimentation in the relevant domain.21
It is a platitude that scientists typically do not begin an investigation into an
empirical question without having already formulated hypotheses about how
the question might be answered. Such hypotheses will influence the course
of their empirical research, e.g. by determining which things they choose to
observe and which experiments they decide to carry out. In that sense, the
21There are similarities between the role I describe for IBE here and what Charles S.
Peirce calls Abduction. In particular, Peirce describes Abduction as warranting only a
probative kind of acceptance for the purposes of inductive examination (Kapitan, 1992, 12-
17). However, in contrast to Peirce, I am not arguing here that IBE has a role to play
in generating new hypotheses in what Reichenbach (1938) called “the context of discovery”
(see, e.g., Minnameier, 2004; Campos, 2011).
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gathering of scientific evidence is routinely guided by theoretical assumptions.
The point applies in everyday cases as well. Consider, for example, our de-
tective case: Before leaving the crime scene, the detective will have made
observations, taken samples, and interviewed suspects. But where should she
look? What should she sample? Who should she interview, and what ques-
tions should she ask? The answers to these questions will be determined by
the detective’s assumptions about the case, including in particular her suspi-
cion about the actual cause of the victim’s death. Generally, decisions about
what evidence to gather will, at least for rational agents, be determined in
large part by one’s theoretical assumptions and suspicions about the subject
matter under investigation.
Of course, if one is logically and theoretically omniscient, as ideal Bayesian
agents are, then one will have entertained the entire logical space of possible
hypotheses and assigned probabilities to every single hypothesis in that space.
So, for ideal Bayesian agents, decisions about what evidence to gather will be
made on the basis of such probabilities directly. However, ordinary epistemic
agents of the sort that IBE is meant to provide a heuristics for will seldom,
if ever, be able to simultaneously entertain all hypotheses in logical space and
assign a probability to each one. Ordinary agents of this sort will instead fo-
cus on a limited number – often only one – of the available hypotheses about
the subject matter under investigation, which then serve as her primary guide
to how she should proceed in the investigations that follow. I will refer to
hypotheses that serve this role in an agent’s epistemic life as working hypothe-
ses.22
Now, rational agents will clearly seek to minimize the risk of devoting time
and resources to investigating hypotheses that further research will show to
be false, i.e. dead-end hypotheses. Thus, all other things being equal, rational
agents will seek to adopt working hypotheses that are maximally probable in
light of the evidence. This is where I suggest that IBE enters the picture, for
recall that through providing a heuristic for comparative probabilistic evalu-
22Note that here and throughout I use the plural “working hypotheses”. This is to em-
phasize that sometimes we may want to adopt more than one working hypotheses simulta-
neously, especially when no single hypotheses is decisively the most promising of those that
are available.
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ations, IBE in effect also provides a heuristic for ranking a given set of hy-
potheses in terms of their (objective Bayesian) probabilities. In particular,
then, IBE can be used as a heuristic for identifying the hypotheses with the
highest such probabilities in a given set of available hypotheses. My sugges-
tion, then, is that IBE serves as a heuristic for identifying the most probable
of the available explanatory hypotheses to be adopted as working hypotheses
around which further inquiry will be structured.
To illustrate, consider once again our detective case. Since the detective
does not want to waste her efforts on hypotheses that are unlikely to be cor-
roborated by further investigation (and thus unlikely lead to conviction), she
will seek to focus her current investigations on the most probable hypotheses
available. Using explanatory considerations as a heuristic, she may plausibly
come to conclude that Hb is by far the most probable hypothesis because of its
superior explanatory qualities as compared with the available alternatives, Hs
and Ha. Consequently, she adopts Hb as her only working hypothesis, which
in turn will be manifested in the way in which she carries out further inves-
tigation. So, for example, the detective may interrogate the brother, gather
his fingerprints, and check for gun powder on his sleeve, instead of (or at least
prior to) gathering evidence on the victim’s mental history, attempting to lo-
cate a suicide note, and so forth. Although the detective may not have a good
estimation of the absolute (objective Bayesian) probabilities of the three hy-
potheses, she knows enough to make an informed decision which of the three
hypotheses to pursue.
Notice that if IBE plays this rather modest role in an otherwise Bayesian
framework for non-deductive reasoning, then it is entirely appropriate that the
explanatory considerations to which IBE appeals provide a reliable heuristic
only to comparative probabilities in the way I argued in the previous section.
After all, IBE would still provide a guide to locating the most probable of
the available hypotheses for the agent to adopt as working hypotheses, which
enables the agent to minimize as far as possible the risk of adopting working
hypotheses that turn out to be dead ends. While the risk of adopting only
false hypotheses as working hypotheses may often be significant, an agent
can do no better than to let the most probable available hypotheses guide her
further investigations. Thus the choice of adopting the most probable available
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hypotheses as a working hypotheses is made rational by the fact that doing so
optimizes the agent’s chances of adopting a true working hypothesis.23
I am suggesting that comparative probabilistic evaluations serve as the basis
for rational decisions about which hypotheses to adopt as working hypotheses.
One might worry about this on the grounds that, in general, comparative prob-
abilities are not enough for rational decision according to standard Bayesian
decision theory, which requires that the expected utility of each available course
of action be calculated from absolute probabilities of their possible outcomes
and the utilities of those outcomes. By recommending that decisions about
which working hypotheses to adopt be made on the basis of comparative prob-
abilities, it might seem as though I am contradicting this hugely successful and
well-entrenched framework for rational decision making. It’s important to see
that this is not the case.
Just as heuristic conceptions of IBE generally do not aim to replace stan-
dard Bayesian epistemology, but rather to supplement the it by providing an
accessible decision procedure to approximate Bayesian reasoning (see §2), my
suggestion here is that comparative probabilities may provide an accessible
heuristic to approximate standard Bayesian decision theory in the special case
in which we are choosing between competing explanatory hypotheses. One
of the reasons IBE can serve this role is that, other things being equal, the
utility of choosing to adopt each such hypothesis when it is true/false can be
assumed to be equal or at least comparable for truth-seeking agents such as
scientists, since each competing explanatory hypothesis purports to explain the
same range of phenomena as any other such hypothesis. For this reason, com-
parisons between the expected utility of choosing each available hypothesis as
a working hypothesis will, other things being equal, depend only on their com-
23It may be worth highlighting that to adopt something as a working hypothesis is at least
partly a practical choice as opposed to a purely epistemic one. Two agents, S1 and S2, may
have the exact same doxastic attitudes (i.e. beliefs or credences) towards a hypothesis Hi
even though S1 has adopted Hi as a working hypothesis while S2 has not. The difference
between S1 and S2 would be that S1 has decided to focus further investigations around
Hi while S2 has not. This is a practical difference in that it involves a difference in the
prospective actions of S1 and S2. However, there is a sense in which the difference is also
epistemic, since it concerns a difference in how S1 and S2 will carry out their respective
epistemic investigations. For this reason, we may want to say that adopting something as a
working hypothesis involves both practical and epistemic elements.
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parative probabilities for truth-seeking agents. In sum, then, the suggestion I
am making here does not conflict with standard Bayesian decision theory, but
instead complements it by providing an accessible heuristic in the special case
of choosing between competing explanatory hypotheses.
With that said, I want to acknowledge that there will be special cases in
which this heuristic fails to guide us towards rational decisions about what
working hypotheses to adopt. This is because, plausibly, even truth-seeking
agents will sometimes be faced with a choice between competing explanatory
hypotheses where the utilities of adopting each one when they are true/false
are not uniform in this way. The clearest example of such a case will perhaps
be where one of the hypotheses is more easily testable than the others. In
that case, standard decision theory may dictate that it would be rational
for truth-seeking agents adopt the most testable hypothesis as their working
hypothesis even at the expense of other hypotheses that are more probable,
since that may maximize expected utility in the long run. Another case of
this kind might occur when one of the explanatory hypotheses combines with
other hypotheses such as to help answer questions that its alternatives are
unhelpfully silent on, in which case adopting the former might be rational by
standard decision theory’s lights even if it is not among the most probable
competing explanatory hypotheses available. So, on this heuristic conception
of IBE, there might well be cases in which IBE fails to serve its role as a
guide for making rational decisions about what to adopt as one’s working
hypotheses.24
While this brings out a certain limitation of IBE on the current heuristic
conception, it does not significantly undermine IBE’s status as a heuristic for
choosing which working hypotheses to adopt. After all, recall that any heuris-
tic for approximating another form of reasoning (or, in this case, decision
making) will provide only a rough and fallible guide to the latter, so it hardly
counts much against the current conception of IBE as compared with alterna-
tive heuristic conceptions that there be cases in which it falters. Indeed, note
that IBE still provides a reliable guide to expected utility maximizing regard-
ing decisions about which available hypotheses to adopt as working hypotheses
24Thanks to a reviewer for this journal for pressing me on this issue.
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when other things are equal. In particular, it still provides such a guide when
the available competing explanatory hypotheses are (roughly) equally testable
and informative on other questions, since the utility of adopting such hypothe-
ses when they are true/false will certainly be (roughly) uniform. Furthermore,
note that this heuristic may provide ordinary agents with useful information
even in the problematic cases in which the available competing explanatory
hypotheses are not roughly equal in these respects, since even in those cases it
provides agents with information about how to internally rank those subsets
of hypotheses that are equally testable and informative on other questions.25
5 Conclusion
The heuristic conception of IBE promises to show how IBE and Bayesianism
are not only compatible (contra van Fraassen’s (1989) influential argument)
but also complementary. I have argued, however, that there are limitations in
principle to how much can be asked of IBE in this respect, since explanatory
considerations are not typically suitable for indicating the absolute probability
values with which Bayesianism is standardly seen as operating. In light of
these limitations, I have argued that IBE is best construed as a heuristic
for estimating which hypotheses have the highest probability among those
explanatory hypotheses that are available at a given time. I argued that
this helps ordinary agents identify which explanatory hypotheses to adopt as
the working hypotheses around which further investigation is structured. On
this view, IBE complements Bayesianism by providing a heuristic for deciding
how to structure subsequent inquiry in a given domain so as to maximize the
25For example, suppose that in a set of available competing explanatory hypotheses
{H1, ...,Hn}, some three hypotheses H1, H2, and H3 are (roughly) equally testable and in-
formative on other questions. In that case, our heuristic would provide a means to rank
H1, H2, and H3 such as to determine which of the three should be adopted as a work-
ing hypothesis provided that any of them is (and similarly for other subsets of equally
testable/informative hypotheses in {H1, ...,Hn}). In particular, if for example our heuristic
ranks H1 above H2 and H3, this rules out as irrational to adopt only H2 or H3 as working
hypotheses but not also H1.
27
likelihood of success.26
26This paper was presented at the UNC Chapel Hill Philosophy of Science Workshop in
honor of Marc Lange (a.k.a. MarcFest) in November 2015. I am grateful to Marc and the
rest of the audience, and especially my commentator Matt Kotzen. I am also indebted to
Michael Bertrand and a reviewer for this journal for helpful written comments. Research for
this paper was in part supported by an Irish Research Council New Horizons grant (Project
ID: REPRO/2015/89).
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